Posts by Michael


    The report we released today  used a range of sources to confirm the LRA’s movement into Sudanese-controlled territory and Sudan’s renewed support for the rebel group. However, the source likely to generate the most attention is satellite imagery analysis.

    Satellite imagery and other remote sensing technologies are being increasingly adopted for human rights purposes. Efforts being undertaken by the Satellite Sentinel Project — tracking atrocities in Sudan — and Amnesty International USA’s Science and Human Rights team — such as this imagery from Aleppo, Syria– have been particularly pioneering in this regard.

    Our use of satellite imagery showing the probable location of LRA leader Joseph Kony’s recent camp in Sudanese-controlled territory is likely to raise a number of questions. How did we locate the camp? Why are we confident it is actually the LRA’s camp, where Kony is thought to have resided? And how did we get the imagery?

    To be credible, satellite imagery analysis usually needs to be paired with other sources of information.

    In our case, a 2010 UN report documented the LRA’s first incursion into a Sudanese-controlled area known as the Kafia Kingi enclave, which took place in October 2009 and included a meeting with Sudanese military officials near their garrison near the village of Dafak. In 2012, we received new reports from LRA defectors and other sources which indicated the LRA had subsequently established a camp approximately 8-10 kilometers south of the Dafak garrison. In December of 2012, we approached experts at Amnesty International USA with this information, and they offered to purchase imagery analysis of the area from DigitalGlobe, a commercial provider of satellite imagery and analysis.

    DigitalGlobe analysts had identified the likely location of the Dafak garrison in previous analysis, and it matched public reports and our own field research. Civilians displaced by the LRA’s incursion into the area had even helped my teammate Paul draw a rough map showing the Dafak garrison and LRA camps.

    DigitalGlobe’s analysis of a 100 square kilometer area around the Dafak garrison, shared with us on January 10, showed that some time between 2009 and 2011, a camp with four tents was established approximately 8.7 kilometers south of the garrison. Several cultivated plots of land also emerged approximately 3.6 kilometers south of the garrison. Both had been abandoned by early 2013. Though one or both of these may have been created by the LRA, our research had indicated a much larger LRA presence than such a small camp could shelter, so we considered it inconclusive.

    Then, in February and March, we received further reports with new details suggesting that as later waves of LRA members arrived in Kafia Kingi, an LRA encampment had been established further southwest of the garrison, perhaps 15-20 kilometers away, near a river likely to be the Umbelasha. We again approached Amnesty International USA, who generously underwrote further imagery analysis that DigitalGlobe conducted.

    This time, we were confident we found what we were looking for.

    Imagery we received on April 4th clearly showed the emergence of a camp along the banks of the Umbelasha River, 17 kilometers southwest of the Dafak garrison. No human activity was visible in the area until November 2011, when the imagery showed burned grass, a common precursor for planting crops. In the next imagery available, from March 2012, semi-permanent structures had been built and there was clear delineation of farmland with crops planted that matched LRA defector reports. The camp reached peak activity in December of 2012, before being abandoned some time between February and March 2013, again matching information from multiple sources.

    As for LRA leader Joseph Kony, several LRA defectors had testified that he first moved into Kafia Kingi in late 2010. After a short time there, during which some of his deputies met again with Sudanese officials, he reportedly moved back into Central African Republic before returning again to Kafia Kingi in late 2011. This time frame corresponds with the initial signs of the encampment 17 kilometers southwest of Dafak. Our research suggested Kony likely stayed at the LRA’s encampment in Kafia Kingi for significant portions of 2012. None of our research has indicated there was more than one major LRA camp complex in the enclave, indicating that the one we identified was likely where Kony stayed.

    Other knowledgeable sources have since confirmed that the camp we located in Sudanese-controlled territory has also been identified by Ugandan military officials — likely with assistance from their US partners — as likely to be Kony’s recent camp.

    Is any of this bullet proof? No. Nor has every piece of information we received about LRA presence in Sudanese-controlled territory over the past three years matched up perfectly, though faulty memories and the difficulty of gaining access to these areas makes that all but inevitable. However, we received enough credible information from a range of independent sources to give us confidence in our report’s findings, including those derived from satellite imagery analysis.

    Now that the report is published and the information is public, we will be turning our attention toward galvanizing international action to ensure Sudan’s support to the LRA is now definitively ended. In the meantime, we owe a huge debt of gratitude to Amnesty International USA and DigitalGlobe for their support for this effort.

    -Michael Poffenberger

     

     

    Q&A on new rewards for Kony & Co

     

    Earlier today, the US Ambassador for Global Criminal Justice Stephen Rapp announced that LRA leaders Joseph Kony, Dominic Ongwen, and Okot Odhiambio – as well as Rwandan rebel leader Sylvestre Madacumura – are being added to the US War Crimes Rewards (WCR) program, authorizing a reward of up to $5 million to anyone who provides information leading to their arrest. Notably, the announcement was made possible by the passage of legislation sponsored by then-Senator Kerry (D-MA) and Representative Ed Royce (R-CA); it was the last legislation Kerry sponsored that passed before he became US Secretary of State.

    This new tool could prove critical for efforts to bring LRA commanders to justice and end the group’s atrocities, though its implementation does carry some risks. The program also only works if there is an entity that can act on tip-offs received; in other words, if US and Ugandan forces withdraw from operations to pursue the LRA as reports indicate they may, the program will be largely toothless.

    In this post, we discuss whether the WCR program can have a role in securing the arrest of Kony and his two deputies, and the details of how it will be implemented. You can also find more information on the website of the program itself.

    What is “War Crimes Rewards” and “Rewards for Justice?”
    A program called “Rewards for Justice” was first established in 1984 targeting foreign terrorists who pose a threat to the United States. The State Department later expanded the program by adding “War Crimes Rewards” in 1998 to help track down fugitives wanted for war crimes. It can provide rewards of up to $5 million for information that leads to the arrest of specific criminals.

    Who is eligible to be targeted by WCR?
    Originally, only individuals indicted by special tribunals for Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and Sierra Leone were eligible to be targeted by the program. However, on January 15, 2013, President Obama signed into law a bill making any foreign national accused of crimes against humanity, genocide, or war crimes by any international, mixed, or hybrid criminal tribunal eligible targets for WCR. This includes Kony, Ongwen, and Odhiambo, who were indicted by International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2005. The bill’s passage marked the first time that Congress has authorized a formal relationship between the US and the ICC , which many Members of Congress have previously opposed.

    How can this be used to help bring LRA leaders to justice?
    By adding Kony, Ongwen, and Odhiambio to the WCR program, the State Department has increased the chances they will be brought to justice in several ways.

    First, the financial reward could incentivize LRA fighters and commanders to defect from the LRA in order to share information about the location of the three eligible commanders with US authorities. This would not only lead to better information on their whereabouts, but also drain the LRA of the fighters essential for its survival. Crucially, it could also sow divisions and suspicions within LRA ranks if Kony and other commanders fear betrayal, which would further diminish their capacity to perpetrate attacks on civilians.

    Second, the financial reward could incentivize local hunters, nomadic groups (such as the Mbororo), or other people who may have information about the location of the three eligible commanders to share it with US authorities. Community members in some LRA-affected areas of CAR and Congo that have been repeatedly targeted by LRA attacks have already been willing to share information about the location of LRA groups and commanders. However, people in areas of northern CAR and Sudan, where senior LRA commanders are thought to be located, have been less cooperative, so a financial reward could provide the impetus needed to facilitate information sharing.

    Less likely (but still possible), lowly research groups such as ourselves or others working in LRA-affected areas could presumably benefit from a reward.

    How can it be advertised, especially to LRA groups in remote areas?
    The WCR program has a budget for advertising the financial reward for the three LRA commanders, and in the coming weeks US government officials will spreading the word in a variety of ways. They will likely use radio broadcasts as the main tool, but could also use leaflet drops over areas of LRA activity and briefings for local communities.

    Who can receive the award, and how can they share the information?
    Anybody is eligible to receive the financial award, with the exception of government officials acting in their official capacity and individuals under US sanction. To receive the award, the information provided by the individual must lead to the arrest, transfer, or conviction of one of the three LRA commanders. The State Department website has guidance on how to directly share information regarding the whereabouts of an indictee. To determine the size of the reward, the State Department takes into consideration the importance of the target, the risk taken by informant, the value of the specific information they gave, and other factors. Most rewards issued range from $400,000 to $2 million.

    Do informants face any risk?
    Though the LRA will likely be unable to identify or locate specific informants, some informants could face risks or challenges, such as coping with a large influx of cash while living in an impoverished community. To minimize risk to the informant, the State Department does not reveal the identity of informants and can provide a range of witness protection measures.

    Is there any risk of LRA reprisal attacks?
    Though the LRA has intentionally reduced civilian killings in recent years, there will be a risk of LRA reprisal attacks. LRA commanders have ordered reprisal attacks and massacres following the launch of international interventions in the past, including the announcement of the ICC indictments in 2005 and the launch of Operation Lightning Thunder in 2008. To mitigate this risk, US officials should work with military forces, peacekeepers, and early warning civilian protection networks in LRA-affected areas to ensure they are informed about the WCR program and are taking steps to prevent LRA reprisal attacks.

    The high stakes of withdrawal

     

    civil-society-in-haut-mbomou-e1364926309390

    With the Ugandan and US operations focused on stopping LRA atrocities hovering close to collapse due to unrest in the Central African Republic (CAR), we joined partners to release a statement today urging the two governments to stay committed to the mission.

    “As the international community seeks to address the upheaval in CAR, it is critical that they find ways to sustain efforts to address LRA violence. A premature withdrawal would have devastating and immediate consequences for civilians in LRA-affected areas,” the statement reads. “It gives Kony a new lease on life, enabling him to regain power by initiating new rounds of abductions in communities that will be left totally unprotected and vulnerable to LRA attacks.”

    Ten local civil society organizations in CAR held a meeting just this morning to discuss the situation and issued their own statements, which you can read here. Some select quotes from local leaders:

    “If these two force leave us, we will fall back in the same situation that we found during the highest times of the LRA conflict.” -Local Protection Committee of Obo

    “No one here ignores the intrinsic value of the support these two forces provide in the fight against the LRA rebels of Joseph Kony. From the depths of our hearts, women from Haut-Mbomou oppose themselves to this precipitated departure, as it will lead to sexual abuse on girls and women, and to them becoming porters.” – Women Association

    “We pray you to reconsider your decision. After the forces leave, LRA will enter immediately in our city. Because Haut Mbomou is an autonomous district, Bangui does not react to our calls of distress.’” – Radio Zereda

    “In our opinion, the departure of Ugandan and American troops from our region wold be a disaster. We, in the name of the religious leaders in the LRA-affected region, pray you to retract this decision, until the day this Ugandan rebel group will be ousted out of CAR.” – Catholic Church leader

    Ugandan and US operations — which have been authorized by the African Union and focused on LRA-affected areas of CAR — have made significant progress in reducing LRA atrocities in recent years. However, the Ugandan government suspended their operations last week after the CAR government was overthrown.

    - Michael

    Counter-LRA operations suspended

     

    Tuesday, we posted about how political upheaval in the Central African Republic (CAR) may threaten regional efforts to end LRA atrocities. Today, we received worrying news: it appears Uganda and the US have suspended operations to pursue the LRA, at least temporarily.

    Initial reports suggest the US draw back was sparked by questions over whether the Ugandans intend to continue the mission. The US role is only advisory and depends on partner governments in the region to lead, particularly Uganda. While Ugandan officials announced publicly that they will sustain their operations, there are some reports suggesting this may not be the case and that they are still weighing options in the aftermath of the CAR change of government.

    As we wrote Tuesday, the Ugandan-led, US-supported military operations, which were authorized by the African Union in 2011, have helped reduce the LRA threat significantly in recent years. LRA attacks, killings, and abductions of civilians have declined precipitously. However, the withdrawal of Ugandan and US forces now — or any time before Joseph Kony is captured and the group’s command structure fully dismantled — could allow these gains to be reversed.

    The recent upheaval in CAR has caused a humanitarian crisis for much of the country and deserves urgent attention from the international community. It is possible that the broader dynamics there will eclipse operations against the LRA. However, it will be critical to guard against any decision to end regional counter-LRA efforts that is premature or unnecessary, as it will leave civilians much more exposed to further LRA atrocities and set back hopes for a permanent end to the crisis.

    - Michael

    Traders demonstrate near the presidential palace in Bangui

    A violent change of government that took place in the Central African Republic over the weekend could lead to the withdrawal of Ugandan and US forces working to track down LRA groups in the eastern part of the country. The departure of Ugandan and US forces from CAR, which are operating there under an authorization from the African Union and with permission from the previous CAR government, would create a security vacuum in LRA-affected areas and allow the reversal of significant gains made against the LRA in recent years.

    The “Seleka” coalition, as it is known, seized control of the capital city of Bangui on Sunday. One of the rebel leaders, Michel Djotodia (profiled here), has claimed the Presidency while deposed President Francoise Bozize has fled to Cameroon. Seleka is a combination of five different CAR rebel groups that emerged in December of 2012 with claims that the central government had not delivered on promises made in previous peace agreements.

    Seleka representatives previously called for the exit of all “foreign forces” from CAR. While they are likely focused most on the Chadian, South African, and other forces from neighboring countries that deployed in a (failed) effort to protect the former regime, there are indications they may ask Ugandan and US forces, which operate only with permission from the central government, to leave as well. A senior Seleka leader recently called publicly for the Ugandans to leave, though Ugandan and US government sources indicated to us that no formal request for their departure has been made since Seleka seized power.

    The Ugandans have pursued the LRA in CAR, with some success, since 2009. In 2011, the African Union provided a political mandate for regional operations against the LRA and the US sent military advisors to support the Ugandan-led efforts. During this time, LRA attacks, killings, and abductions of civilians have declined significantly, and defections from LRA ranks have surged.

    The withdrawal of Ugandan and US forces now – or any time before Joseph Kony is captured and the group’s command structure fully dismantled – could reverse these gains. The Ugandan-led military operations have weakened the LRA and prevented them from being able to integrate many of the civilians they abduct into their ranks. Without military pressure, Kony could rebuild much of the capacity that the LRA has lost over the past several years. And with no alternative forces that can pursue the LRA or provide protection, civilians in LRA-affected areas – who have largely welcomed the Ugandan and US deployments – would be left more exposed to LRA attacks.

    One of Seleka’s member groups, the UFDR, itself clashed with the LRA back in 2010, and a field interview we conducted with a UFDR representative in 2011 suggested they view the LRA with extreme hostility. However, the UFDR may have received some support for its rebellion from the Government of Sudan (as many civil society leaders in eastern CAR believe and this 2007 HRW report alleges), which has an interest in seeing its longtime enemy Uganda depart from its backyard in CAR. In 2010, disputes between Ugandan and UFDR forces over control of diamond mines in the town of Sam Ouandja (Ugandan forces were allegedly preventing the UFDR from exploiting the illegal diamond trade, though this is disputed) also led to the Ugandans being forced to leave that town.

    All this to say: there is cause for concern that the political upheaval in CAR could deal a devastating setback for international efforts to end LRA atrocities. In the short term, there is no alternative to the Ugandan-led, US-supported operations that could realistically hope to address the LRA’s threat to civilians. As international leaders engage with the newly installed CAR government to help reestablish some semblance of security and democratic governance in the country, they should urge cooperation with the African Union-authorized regional counter-LRA mission and allow Ugandan and US forces to stay put.

    - Michael

     

    “The more things change the more they stay the same”

    Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr said that. You might not know who he is, and that’s okay (neither do we). However, we like what he said, especially today.

    You’ll probably notice some changes to our website in the coming weeks, the most obvious being our new name: The Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative. While our name is getting a facelift, our mission remains the same, and our commitment to seeing peace in areas of central Africa affected by the LRA crisis is as strong as ever. In fact, as our new tagline suggests, we have no plans for our organization to outlast the crisis we’re currently working to address.

    Instead, as we’ve done many times during our eight years advocating for an end to LRA atrocities, we’re evolving in service of our mission. As we reshape Resolve into The Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative, we’re aiming to strengthen our role as a hub for timely information on the LRA crisis and a go-to source for innovative solutions. We want to ensure that government agencies, organizations, and partners working to end this conflict have the information and direction they need to succeed.

    This includes more focus on investigative field research from our Director of Policy, Paul Ronan, which helps uncover the impact of new developments in the conflict like LRA presence in the Sudanese-controlled Kafia Kingi enclave and US military advisors being deployed to LRA-affected areas. It includes sustaining our work on the LRA Crisis Tracker project and producing reports like the 2012 Annual Security Brief that analyze LRA atrocities. And there will be more done to share our research and findings with supporters and partners through our blog and social media.

    But we’re not just an information source; we’re do-ers. As such, we’ll continue working to influence policy and programs that can help end this conflict and advocating directly with policy leaders on the LRA issue. But unlike before, we won’t be organizing grassroots advocacy campaigns in support of our goals. Instead, we’ve partnered with Invisible Children to launch a new advocacy initiative called Citizen, which is being overseen by our former Director of Field Outreach (and all-around life powerhouse) Lisa Dougan. Our past campaigns helped see historic bills passed and new programs on the ground funded, and we expect even more of these results moving forward. You can check out what Citizen is already doing here.

    Thanks for your patience as we make these changes. Our impact is only possible through the support and collaboration from our partners and allies, and – as always – we’re grateful for yours.

    - Michael

    Yesterday, we were honored to join President Obama for the signing of a bill that authorizes rewards of up to $5 million for information that leads to the arrest of wanted war criminals, including LRA leader Joseph Kony. The measure provides an exciting new tool for efforts to end LRA atrocities in central Africa.

    As a result of the legislation, anyone indicted by “international, hybrid, or mixed tribunals for genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity” are newly eligible targets of the U.S. “Rewards for Justice” program. Now that the bill has become law, the State Department is likely to announce a financial reward for information that leads to the arrest of Kony and his top deputies in the coming weeks.

    An official statement issued by President Obama specifically names Kony as the first target for the new program and reaffirms U.S. commitment to help stop mass violence wherever it occurs. “This powerful new tool can be used to help bring to justice perpetrators of the worst crimes known to human kind.  This includes individuals such as Joseph Kony and other leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army… We have made unmistakably clear that the United States is committed to seeing war criminals and other perpetrators of atrocities held accountable for their crimes,” he said.

    Activists all across the country, mobilized for the “Kony 2012″ campaign, lobbied for the bill’s passage since it was first introduced in February of last year. Dozens of Members of Congress responded by sponsoring the bill and affirming its potential to help bring Kony to justice and stop LRA attacks.

    A statement from Representative Ed Royce (R-CA), the bill’s original author and incoming Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, celebrated the bill’s passage. “This bill responds to the need to develop more tools to pursue the world’s worst. Target one is Joseph Kony, the murderous head of the LRA. U.S. military advisors working in Central Africa consider a reward offer on Kony as critical to their effort. This action bolsters the hunt.”

    Senator John Kerry (D-MA), the former Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and President Obama’s nominee to become the next U.S. Secretary of State, introduced the Senate version of the bill. Other key champions included Representative Jim McGovern (D-MA) and Senators Johnny Isakson (R-GA), Chris Coons (D-DE), and John Boozman (R-AR), and Mary Landrieu (D-LA).

    The Resolve was privileged to be represented at the bill’s signing. We will be working in the coming months to help see it implemented effectively, so stay tuned.

    - Michael

     

    This is the third of three top stories we’re sharing from 2012. They were chosen by our team as demonstrations of our impact and shared as a token of our thanks. You can find the first post here and the second post here.

    On December 14, 2009, a band of just a few dozen LRA fighters entered a small village in the Makombo area of Democratic Republic of Congo. They proceeded from house to house, killing or abducting anyone they encountered. Over the next four days, they repeated this tactic in at least nine additional villages, killing 321 people and abducting more than 250.

    The Congolese government failed to protect their people from these attacks, which came to be known as the “Makombo Massacres.” But the reality is that the government doesn’t have the troops or capabilities needed to always do so, especially in the remote areas where the LRA operates. So what else could have saved those 321 people?

    As it turns out, there is a simple solution, and The Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative has been working to see it implemented. If the communities attacked could have communicated with each other, they could have been provided advance warning of the LRA’s presence in the area and taken measures to escape the attacks.

    My teammate Paul first identified the need to expand early warning communications networks in his 2010 report, “From Promise to Peace.”  After two years of sustained lobbying, the US Congress allocated $10 million for this purpose in the 2012 budget. Then, in October of this year, the US announced the launch of a new project to develop mobile phone and radio communications systems in LRA-affected areas, using the funds allocated by Congress.

    With advance warning, many of the 321 people killed in the “Makombo Massacres” could have been saved. And this new program, made possible by The Resolve’s work, could prevent it from happening again.

    We are committed to keep going until Kony’s forces no longer threaten people in central Africa. This week, we’re looking for just 20 people to sign up as The Resolve Cosponsors, committing as little as $20/month to protect our mission.

    Today is the final day of the pledge drive. Click here to help us out by becoming one of those 20 people today!

    - Michael

    *photo credit: Invisible Children


    This is the second of three top stories we’re sharing from 2012, chosen by our team as demonstrations of our impact and shared as a token of our thanks. You can find the first post here.

    The first time we ever heard from him, Fr. Benoit Kinalegu had an urgent message to share. On September 18, 2008, he wrote to sound an alarm over a wave of deadly LRA attacks against communities surrounding his town of Dungu in the remote northeastern area of Democratic Republic of Congo. Six communities had been simultaneously targeted by Kony’s forces the day before. In one village, Fr. Benoit said, the LRA marched 50 schoolchildren from their classroom straight into the bush.

    A few days later, when we reached him by phone, he shared one request: that we help “make sure the world is informed about these atrocities.”

    Afterward, we helped relay messages from Fr. Benoit and others on to the policymakers deciding how to respond to the LRA’s attacks in Congo. But his words were always more powerful than ours, and this year, we wanted Fr. Benoit to share his experiences directly. So in June of 2012, Fr. Benoit and Sr. Angelique Namaika, also from Congo, made the long journey to Washington.

    Our team hosted them to meetings with government officials, many of whom were newly seized of the issue in the aftermath of the Kony 2012 film and looking for a way to help. In a testimony before the U.S. Congress, in regards to LRA atrocities, Fr. Benoit said that “the international community, and the government of the United States have taken note… But I am here to tell you personally that the situation on the ground remains dire for communities. The attacks continue and the LRA remains a serious threat, leaving in its wake hundreds of thousands of people displaced and deeply traumatized.” The following week, Members of Congress wrote to President Obama demanding increased funds be dedicated to help protect civilians vulnerable to LRA attacks.

    After Washington, we hosted them to brief the United Nations Security Council in New York. Sr. Angelique shocked the delegates into silence by showing them images of her community members who were maimed in LRA attacks, disputing claims made by her government that the LRA was no longer a threat. In a unanimous statement the following week, the Security Council called for “an immediate end to all attacks by the LRA, particularly those on civilians.”

    This year, many voices clamored with opinions about Joseph Kony and the LRA. The Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative worked to make sure the right voices were heard, and polices were advanced that can actually help end LRA atrocities for good.

    This work has to be sustained. Kony’s forces were still able to carry out 266 attacks that we recorded against civilians in 2012, and they must be stopped.

    This week, we’re looking for just 20 people to sign up as The Resolve Cosponsors, committing as little as $20/month to protect our mission. Click here to help us out by becoming one of those 20 people today.

    - Michael

    This week we are sharing three top stories from 2012, chosen by our team as demonstrations of our impact and shared as a token of our thanks.

    Our first is a story that stands above the rest as a sign of hope for our work. Contributions from The Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative supporters enabled us to advance U.S. actions that helped a wave of LRA fighters and abductees escape from the group in 2012 — maybe even as many as the previous three years combined.

    With adequate resources, there are tools we’ve long advocated for that can overcome the fear that Kony and his senior commanders use to prevent LRA fighters and abductees from trying to escape. Way back in 2010, we argued successfully that expanding use of these tools should be a central aim of President Obama’s LRA strategy, which was then being drafted.

    The two most effective tools that we highlighted are leaflets that can be dropped by air or tied to trees in areas of suspected LRA movement and FM radio broadcasts. Both mediums often feature messages from previous LRA escapees or family members of LRA fighters, encouraging those who remain in the bush to defy Kony and come home. In areas as remote as the parts of central Africa where the LRA operates it takes significant resources to make these tools work, so we also worked with activists and Members of Congress to secure increased resources for them in the U.S. budget.


    Those efforts are now paying off as programs to help LRA fighters and abductees to escape from the group are being expanded rapidly. In one example of their impact, The Resolve’s researcher Paul Ronan interviewed a Ugandan man in October who had been abducted by the LRA in 1996 at age 17, near the town of Gulu in Uganda. Even though he had spent almost half his life being forced to fight for Kony, he gained courage to escape after picking up a leaflet featuring a message from Caesar Achellam, an LRA commander who was captured by Ugandan forces in May.

    New leadership from the U.S. is now helping these efforts go one step further. After recognizing that LRA commanders can prevent their abductees from hearing radio messages or picking up fliers, U.S. military advisors deployed to the region last year found a way to send messages that no one can stop. Using industrial speakers mounted to the bottom of helicopters, they are broadcasting “come home” messages directly to the LRA in overhead flights. Our work in 2012 helped convinced President Obama to extend the deployment of those advisors so these efforts can continue.

    The work we do often takes much longer than we wish, but the results can be game-changing. Though it is difficult to monitor, the reports we received indicate that 41 LRA fighters defected in 2012, which is more than we recorded in the previous three years combined. Many others abducted more recently by the LRA — but not yet promoted as fighters — have also been aided in escaping.

    These are the kinds of results that have to be sustained. Kony’s forces were still able to carry out 266 attacks against civilians that we recorded in 2012. They must be stopped for good, and The Resolve’s research and advocacy programs are helping make that happen.

    This week, we’re looking for just 20 people to sign up as The Resolve Cosponsors, committing as little as $20/month to protect our mission. Click here to help us out by becoming one of those 20 people today.

    To peace in 2013–

    Michael

     

     

    *photo credits: Invisible Children

     

    On Dec. 4th, the US Senate passed next year’s defense authorizations bill after adding a new provision urging sustained commitment for efforts to help end LRA atrocities. The amendment was introduced by Senators Jim Inhofe (R-OK) and Chris Coons (D-DE), who chairs the Africa Subcommittee. It passed unanimously. The full text is below.

    Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee, expressed his support when the amendment went for a vote. According to the official Congressional record, Levin commended Senators Inhofe and Coons and added, “The determination to go after Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army is essential not just in terms of the values that we so dearly believe in, but also in terms of avoiding further slaughter that has been perpetrated by Kony.”

    The amendment was added just a week after more than 700 activists from across the country met with their representatives in Congress as part of MOVE:DC, the culminating event of the KONY 2012 campaign.

    A second provision in the final bill specifically authorizes new funds for surveillance tools that help locate LRA groups. We wrote about it when it was added in June. Before becoming law, this legislation must first be reconciled with a version passed earlier this year by the House of Representatives that did not include either of the two LRA-related provisions.

    - Michael

    SEC. 1246. EFFORTS TO REMOVE JOSEPH KONY FROM POWER AND END ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY.

    Consistent with the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 (Public Law 111–172), it is the sense of the Senate that—
    (1) the ongoing United States advise and assist operation to support the regional governments in Africa in their ongoing efforts to apprehend or remove Joseph Kony and his top commanders from the battlefield and end atrocities perpetuated by his Lord’s Resistance Army should continue;
    (2) using amounts authorized to be appropriated by section 301 and specified in the funding table in section 4301 for Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide for ‘‘Additional ISR Support to Operation Observant Compass’’, the Secretary of Defense should provide increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to support the ongoing efforts of United States Special Operations Forces to advise and assist regional partners as they conduct operations against the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa;
    (3) United States and regional African forces should increase their operational coordination; and
    (4) the regional governments should recommit themselves to the operations sanctioned by the African Union Peace and Security Council resolution.

    Today, we joined ten other organizations in jointly releasing a new report revealing that the United Nations has failed to make meaningful progress in implementing its strategy to address LRA atrocities in the six months since it was released. You can read the full report here.

    In Getting Back on Track: Implementing the UN Regional Strategy on the LRA, we hold the UN strategy against its own standards and show that progress has been slow to nonexistent in most areas. Key measures that should have been implemented by now — such as expanded communications infrastructure in LRA-affected areas, agreement among all actors for how to treat LRA abductees who escape, and cooperation among regional governments in the African Union’s regional military mission — have not been reached.

    When we first wrote about the UN strategy, we applauded its content but noted many of these same challenges to seeing it implemented. The report highlights inadequate donor funds, absent cooperation from the governments of Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo, and weak leadership from the UN Secretary General as some of the key impediments to progress thus far.

    Because the LRA is committing attacks in an area that spans several countries, leadership from the UN remains crucial to a coordinated and effective response to the crisis. The UN Security Council will meet to discuss the LRA and the progress made so far in implementing the UN strategy on December 18, providing a key opportunity for the US representative on the Council to press for improvements.

    -Michael

 
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