Paul

When young people act, senators listen

May 10, 2012 by Paul

When it comes to getting things done in Washington, one of the keys is to have strong champions in Congress. And – as Senators Chris Coons (D-DE) and Mary Landrieu (D-LA) wrote in an editorial this week – it is the actions of young people across the country who have inspired them to take a stand:

“Letters and emails have poured into Washington from students from around the country, each bearing the same message our own children delivered to us: Kony and the LRA must be stopped and brought to justice…. Our challenge as Senators is now the same as our challenge as parents — sustaining this newfound level of engagement and interest.”

The message couldn’t be clearer: when young people act, Senators listen. And Senators Landrieu and Coons recognize the power and importance of this:

“There are moments in history, rare as they are, when millions of Americans galvanize around a crisis far from home and try to find a way to act. This can be one of those once-in-a-generation moments.”

As far as action goes, these two are leading the way. Senator Coons joined with Senator Inhofe (R-OK) to introduce the KONY 2012 Congressional resolution, and spearheaded the creation of a video where he joins seven other Senators in discussing why this issue matters to him.

Senator Landrieu is leading efforts to increase funding for programs in central Africa that help rescue and rehabilitate LRA abductees. She also introduced a Senate resolution supporting leadership from the African Union to help governments in the region protect their people from LRA attacks.

Now we need even more Senators to follow their lead. And to make sure that happens, we need only heed these Senator’s advice: when young people act, Senators listen.

So take a moment right now to act and make sure your representatives join Senator Landrieu and Senator Coons. Take action here.

Kony receiving support from Sudan, say Ugandan officials

May 4, 2012 by Paul

Ugandan officials have recently claimed that the Sudanese government has resumed support for the LRA. Military officials say that recently-captured LRA had new uniforms provided by the Sudanese military. Uganda’s foreign affairs minister claims that Khartoum is providing the LRA with guns, medicine, and uniforms, though military officials say they currently do not have concrete evidence of weapons provision.

From 1994-2005, the Sudanese government supported the LRA as a proxy force, providing them with arms, supplies, and safe haven. At the same time, the US and Ugandan governments gave support to the South Sudanese SPLA rebel forces, who are now the national military for the newly-independent South Sudan. Sudan’s president, Omar Al-Bashir, who joined Kony on the International Criminal Court’s list of indictees for crimes against humanity in Sudan’s president, Omar Al-Bashir, who joined Kony on the International Criminal Court’s list of indictees for crimes against humanity in 2009, allowed the LRA to maintain their primary bases in the south of the country, from which they committed attacks on northern Uganda. This Sudanese support allegedly dried up in the mid-2000′s, though since then there have been periodic allegations of resumed support.

LRA leaders reportedly met with the Sudanese military in South Darfur in 2009 soliciting supplies, and Kony was reported to be in Darfur in October 2010. The most recent reports became public last month, including in a press release by Human Rights Watch. Last week Ugandan military officials told reporters that Kony is currently believed to be moving between southeast Central African Republic and Sudan’s Darfur region.

–Kaitlyn

Reflections on the African Union’s announcement of new efforts to address LRA violence

April 10, 2012 by Paul

The gears of the international community are turning after the launch of the Kony 2012 campaign. On the heels of bipartisan U.S. Congressional resolutions about the LRA, the African Union (AU) separately announced two weeks ago that it would be launching a regional initiative and forming a 5,000 person military force to fight the LRA. The AU plans have been in the works for months and there are still a lot of details to be worked out, but the announcement is a welcome sign that the AU is bringing renewed energy and attention to the LRA crisis. Abou Moussa, the UN envoy for the region, sounded a note of urgency while announcing the plan, saying that “the most important thing is that no matter how little the LRA may be, it still constitutes a danger … they continue to attack and create havoc.”

Regional cooperation is essential to capturing Kony and ending the havoc that the LRA produces (see our recent report that explains why), so the AU initiative is a step in the right direction. Right now, Ugandan troops that are pursuing LRA leaders don’t have permission to cross into the Democratic Republic of Congo, thereby creating a potential safe-haven for LRA leadership in the DRC. And some fear that the LRA might also find refuge in the Darfur region of Sudan. The AU efforts will hopefully improve regional cooperation, and make ending Kony’s reign of terror something that governments cooperate on, not squabble over. To boost the AU’s efforts, the Obama Administration should strongly support the work of AU LRA envoy Francisco Madeira, who is leading diplomatic efforts to defrost tensions between regional governments.

As for the troops, at least part of the force will be made-up of Ugandan, Congolese, Central African, and South Sudanese troops who are already deployed in LRA-affected areas. The AU military force will have a headquarterns in Yambio, South Sudan and a political office in Central African Republic.

Some might wonder: Is the Kony 2012 campaign the reason this is happening? In short, not entirely: these plans have been in the works for months. But it seems clear that the Kony 2012 campaign certainly added urgency to the launch of the AU initiative. Indeed, Moussa said international interest in Kony had been “useful, very important”.

If the AU efforts result in increased regional cooperation, we believe they could significantly hasten the day that LRA violence finally ends and Joseph Kony is brought to justice. We will keep you updated as more information about this AU initiative becomes available. Stay tuned.

*Photo credit: Reuters

Uganda’s amnesty, central Africa’s hope

March 28, 2012 by Paul

In the past few weeks there has been unprecedented attention around the world on the need to arrest Joseph Kony and end LRA atrocities in central Africa. However, in the coming months, one of the most important tools needed to achieve this goal – Uganda’s Amnesty Act – could be lost. The Act is set to expire in May, and prospects for its renewal are uncertain at best.

Enacted in 2000, the Amnesty Act provides amnesty from prosecution for individuals who take up arms against the Ugandan government but decide to surrender peacefully. The Act also established the Amnesty Commission, which provides small packages of reintegration support – including cash and basic farming tools – to many LRA returnees and others who accept amnesty, helping them rebuild lives disrupted by war. Over the years, the Act has received overwhelming support from civil society leaders in northern Uganda, as most LRA combatants were abducted against their will and military operations alone have never been adequate to stop the group’s attacks.

Through the use of persistent “come home” radio programming and direct outreach to LRA fighters encouraging them to surrender and accept amnesty, over 10,000 LRA members – a number 30 times the group’s current strength – defected and received amnesty between 2000 and 2008. Since 2008, hundreds more Ugandan members of the LRA have taken advantage of amnesty, helping to deplete LRA ranks and diminish their ability to attack communities in their current area of operations in Congo, Central African Republic, and South Sudan. These defectors also provide regional governments with valuable information about where LRA groups are located, helping them anticipate what communities may be most at risk of attack.

As a UN official in Dungu recently explained to me, ongoing initiatives to encourage the defection of the Ugandan fighters and commanders that make up the core of the LRA are wholly dependent on the existence of the Amnesty Act. Without it, many LRA fighters and abductees will fear prosecution if they surrender or are caught, driving them to stay within the rebel ranks and continue attacking civilians.

However, with the LRA no longer active in Uganda, some there are questioning whether the legislation is still relevant and appropriate. Many point out that the Act grants amnesty and provides reintegration support to LRA commanders accused of terrible crimes, while victims of LRA violence often receive little or no assistance or reparations. The Ugandan government also sees the Act as an impediment to their desire to prosecute some LRA commanders accused of war crimes (including Thomas Kwoyelo and has raised the concern that the Act brings Ugandan law out of alignment with international human rights law. Some within the Ugandan government are now discussing whether the Act can be renewed with amendments that allow for the prosecution of the most senior LRA commanders, but many think it should be allowed to simply expire.

That would be a mistake. Allowing the Amnesty Act to expire would cause great concern in northern Uganda and other war-affected areas of the country, and make people who have already received amnesty uneasy about their futures. It would leave dozens of Ugandans who have escaped the LRA or other Ugandan rebel groups over the past six months in legal limbo, as dysfunction within the Amnesty Commission has prevented them from receiving their official amnesty certificates.

But most importantly, and often unrecognized in the current debates within Uganda, the end of the Amnesty Act would severely undermine current efforts to encourage Ugandan LRA fighters and commanders to peacefully surrender. The UN and others are now working to expand ongoing programs that use FM radio broadcasts and aerial leafleting to encourage fighters and abductees in LRA ranks to defect. These programs have already shown success, and hold even greater future promise with their expansion. If the Act expires, these efforts will be back at square one.

As a result, many opportunities to help LRA abductees escape and reduce the group’s capacity to attack civilians would be lost. Civilians in LRA-affected areas of central Africa would bear the worst of the consequences.

- Paul

The pulse on the LRA – and Kony 2012 – from South Sudan

March 14, 2012 by Paul

Yesterday I visited the geographic heart of LRA violence in central Africa, a small town called Ezo where the borders of South Sudan, Central African Republic, and Congo all converge. Every weekend, people from all three countries gather at a border market there to trade goods, catch up with distant family and friends, and exchange information on LRA activity.

My visit there was immensely encouraging, as local leaders told me how the LRA has not attacked the area in over six months, allowing thousands of people displaced by the LRA to return to their farms. This was a far cry from my first visit here in 2010, where people were still traumatized by a recent attack in which LRA forces occupied the center of town for an entire night, knocking down doors, looting goods, and abducting women gathered to sing and worship in the local church.

But below the surface, people in Ezo are still frightened. They know LRA attacks are extremely unpredictable, and the recent resurgence of LRA raids just across the border in Congo has heightened fear that their communities will be targeted next. One farmer’s comment summed up what I heard time and time again when I asked people when they will feel truly safe: “We will know we are free when Kony is captured.” A simplistic answer perhaps, but it speaks to a broader truth that cannot be ignored: As long as Kony and the LRA are allowed to run free, hundreds of thousands of people in the region will go to sleep each night afraid for their future.

Amazingly, several community leaders in Ezo had heard of the Kony 2012 campaign. All were overwhelmingly happy to know there was renewed attention on the need to stop Kony and senior LRA commanders from committing attacks. (I’d urge any critic of the Kony 2012 campaign who dares say the LRA is no longer a threat to spend a few nights in rural Ezo). One religious leader who had seen the video even said it would encourage ideas on how local leaders could advocate with government officials to get them to do more to address the conflict.

Much has been written in recent weeks about the reactions to the campaign by people in Uganda, which is immensely important given the history of the conflict and the fragility of current transitional justice processes there. But it’s equally important that commenters get the opinion of the people who are living – right now – under the shadow of LRA violence. And so far, their voices have been largely absent from the conversation (though not from the broader debate about how to stop the LRA).

Of course, even the farmers who told me that they need proof of Kony’s demise to feel safe know that merely arresting one man is not the silver bullet for their problems. Families in Ezo will struggle for years to rejuvenate abandoned farms, assist people traumatized by LRA violence, and heal community bonds ripped apart by war and displacement. They will do so mostly with their own sweat, patience, prayer, and tears. We, as the international community, can only hope to play a supporting role to their efforts.

But even as we reaffirm that our role is in the supporting case, we won’t shy away from our belief that stopping Kony is a necessary step towards lasting peace, and that the US is uniquely positioned to help accomplish this as part of the President’s comprehensive strategy to protect and assist LRA-affected communities. And make no mistake – this is a belief informed by hundreds of conversations we’ve had over the past three years with people currently under threat of LRA violence. These conversations have inspired, haunted, and driven us, and will continue to do so until Joseph Kony and the LRA no longer threaten the lives of innocent civilians.

–Paul

Paul Ronan’s reflections on #KONY2012 from Central Africa

March 9, 2012 by Paul

It’s been kind of a surreal experience watching #Kony2012 blow up across the internet the past week, partly because I never expected this niche issue, which has dominated the past 6 years of my life, to gain this much attention. But also because I’ve been watching it blow up on terrible internet connections during my trip to communities actually affected by the LRA in Congo, CAR, and South Sudan (greetings from South Sudan!). But anyway, a few reactions before my nightly dose of rice, beans, and anti-malarials….

Resolve is a partner in the Kony 2012 campaign, and we’re working our butts off to ensure the attention it’s generated translates into concrete action to stop LRA attacks and assist affected communities. That said, there have been legitimate concerns raised by bloggers and civil society groups about the video and the campaign. As someone who’s spent a ton of time over the past few years traveling in LRA-affected areas, I recognize that this is an immensely complex conflict and that US activists and the US government have at best a complementary role in addressing the conflict. Regional governments have been responsible for grievous abuses against the same civilians targeted by the LRA. Ultimately, local communities and governments will play the leading role in forging a lasting peace to this conflict.

None of this is new though – we’ve been saying it for years. The Kony2012 that you’ve seen so far is not a one-off viral phenomenon – it’s just some fireworks in the middle of a long slog aimed at ensuring the US government is doing everything it can to help end a horrific human rights crisis. (For a glimpse at what that slog will look like, check out my latest policy report).

Finally, a note to those criticizing Invisible Children: Just as this conflict shouldn’t be oversimplified, neither should Invisible Children. You can interpret their videos how you want, but their work on the ground in LRA-affected areas of CAR and Congo is all about playing a supporting role to local civil society groups and ensuring there is a comprehensive response to the conflict beyond apprehending Kony.

I’ve just spent two weeks traveling around remote areas of Congo and CAR with Invisible Children field staff. Their work with local partners in northern Congo to implement an HF radio early warning system in remote communities has played a critical role in helping civilians mitigate the risk of LRA attacks and is helping NGOs and policymakers paint a more accurate picture of humanitarian needs and the extent of LRA violence. They are also deeply involved in efforts to peacefully encourage members of the LRA to surrender, including by supporting local FM radio stations that play “come home” messages aimed at countering propaganda by LRA commanders that members of the group can never return home. Their unique awareness raising and fundraising models – blunt and simplistic as they can be – have made this work possible.

So, let the debates about Kony2012 continue. But I really, really hope that all those people who’ve reacted to the video – positively and negatively – can also move beyond the rhetoric and take advantage of this opportunity to help support concrete efforts to bring an end to this terrible conflict and help those affected rebuild their lives.

–Paul

Paul Ronan reporting from Djemah, Central African Republic

March 1, 2012 by Paul

Last week I wrapped up my trip to southeastern Central African Republic (CAR) by visiting Djemah, a tiny town that has been an epicenter of LRA activity for over two years. As we flew there, our pilot pointed out villages abandoned by people fleeing LRA attacks, as well as a huge rock cliff where Kony reportedly gathered LRA fighters in 2009.

I was eager to return to Djemah to see how the situation there had changed since I first visited two years ago. In 2010, few people had a grasp of the situation in Djemah because it was virtually inaccessible by road and had no mobile phone service or HF radio to communicate with the outside world. With the help of an intrepid pilot we flew into the tiny airstrip, and hiked several miles into town. There, community leaders told us of recent LRA attacks, including how just months before our visit LRA forces under Joseph Kony’s command had invaded Djemah town and abducted dozens of people.

The damage could have been far worse if a Ugandan military unit, which had arrived by chance only the night before, hadn’t driven the LRA out of the town. Even so, the community was so traumatized by the attack it dared not even venture outside of town to bury some of the dead. That night in 2010, unable to find a place to stay, we hung our mosquito nets from the wing of the airplane and slept on the runway.

Last week I returned to Djemah for the first time since that trip to see how the community has fared. In many ways, little has changed. Djemah remains the heart of LRA activity in southeast CAR, with Ugandan military forces pursuing senior LRA commanders in the surrounding forests.

Djemah still has no HF radio or mobile phone service, and the mayor told us that surrounding communities write letters and deliver them by hand to tell him of LRA activity. That very morning, we met a man who traveled 30km to Djemah to deliver a letter detailing how two Ugandan women and three small children escaped from the LRA in his community just two days before. That night, we ate dinner around a fire on the runway before again slinging our mosquito nets from the airplane wing.

However, some progress has also been made. The community welcomed the presence of US military advisers, who arrived in Djemah in late 2011 and have reportedly helped motivate Ugandan troops to improve counter-LRA operations and their behavior towards the local population. Several people I talked to in 2010 who had been directly impacted by Kony’s attack in late 2009 were now involved in a community early warning group designed to help protect civilians from future LRA raids. However, much remains to be done. Community expectations for what the US advisers will do to stop the LRA far surpass their current capabilities and mandate. As I wrote in Resolve’s recent report Peace Can Be, President Obama must convince regional governments, including Uganda, to recommit to apprehending senior LRA commanders and protecting civilians. If ongoing efforts are going to succeed, he must also provide greater logistical and intelligence support to forces pursuing the LRA.

In Djemah specifically, US military advisers could play a critical role in helping the Ugandan military encourage defections from the LRA with “come home” messages distributed via mobile FM transmitters and leaflets. US officials can also be of enormous help by supporting the installation of early warning communications technology. In recent months, US officials have had encouraging discussions on how to utilize the funds authorized by Congress in the 2012 budget to ensure Djemah and other towns in CAR can benefit from HF radio, FM radio, and mobile phone projects. These projects should be implemented quickly, and avoid the delays that have plagued similar US projects in Congo. Djemah and surrounding communities have been waiting for such projects for over two years, while the LRA continues to conduct brutal attacks. They can’t afford to wait two more.

–Paul

Resolve responds to recent Foreign Affairs article

November 17, 2011 by Paul

Yesterday several well-respected LRA scholars wrote an in-depth analysis in Foreign Affairs of President Obama’s decision to deploy US advisers to LRA-affected areas. In it they raise several concerns about that decision, many of which we agree with. For instance, we’ve been vocal on the fact that apprehending or killing Kony is not a silver bullet that will bring lasting peace. We’d also agree the US-supported, Ugandan-led Operation Lightning Thunder attack on the LRA in December 2008 was poorly planned and unforgivably failed to prevent massive LRA reprisal attacks on innocent civilians.

All told, we have tremendous respect for the authors and the decades of experience they have between them on this issue. However, this particular piece contained several misleading claims and factual inaccuracies, including some leveled directly at Resolve. We feel it’s important to set the record straight in the interests of continuing the dialogue that the President’s decision has generated over the past few weeks.

Below are a few quotes pulled from the article, and our responses:

1. “Among the most influential of advocacy groups focusing specifically on the LRA are the Enough project, the Resolve campaign, the Canadian-based group GuluWalk, and the media-oriented group Invisible Children. Older agencies, from Human Rights Watch to World Vision, have also been involved. In their campaigns, such organizations have manipulated facts for strategic purposes, exaggerating the scale of LRA abductions and murders and emphasizing the LRA’s use of innocent children as soldiers, and portraying Kony — a brutal man, to be sure — as uniquely awful, a Kurtz-like embodiment of evil.”

Accusing Resolve of “manipulating facts” and “exaggerating the scale of LRA abductions and murders” is a serious charge, and this claim is published with no accompanying substantiation. We’ve done our utmost to ensure we stick to the facts, because our credibility in the eyes of grassroots activists, policymakers, and LRA-affected communities is our most important asset. We’ve encouraged the authors to get specific with their claims, and we’ll gladly continue the conversation from there if they do.

2. “During the past decade, U.S.-based activists concerned about the LRA have successfully, if quietly, pressured the George W. Bush and Obama administrations to take a side in the fight between the LRA and the Ugandan government.” …… “They rarely refer to the Ugandan atrocities or those of Sudan’s People’s Liberation Army, such as attacks against civilians or looting of civilian homes and businesses, or the complicated regional politics fueling the conflict.”

We strongly dispute the claim that Resolve has “sided” with the Ugandan government or “rarely” refers to Ugandan atrocities. The need for the US to respond to atrocities by the Ugandan government was a central pillar of our advocacy efforts during the Juba peace talks, and we continue to help lead efforts inside the Beltway to draw attention to and condemn abuses by Ugandan security forces. Check out a few of our press releases, blogs, and Resolve–initiated civil society letters as just a few examples. We are also one of the few groups that has done field research in currently–affected LRA areas and documented reports of Ugandan military abuses there, and we continue to urge US officials, publicly and privately, to address such concerns. As for ignoring regional politics… check out our last few blogs or our last major policy report as two examples of our continued attention to these dynamics.

3. “Thanks to the efforts of those organizations, in 2004 U.S. President George W. Bush placed the LRA on the U.S. Terrorist Exclusion List, a list of groups involved in “terrorist activity” whose members are banned from entering the country.”

Neither Resolve nor the Enough Project existed in 2004, and Invisible Children was just launching their first documentary and not engaged in the political advocacy scene yet.

4. “Even so, it is hard to set aside fears that the new effort will be no more than a repeat of previous ones [such as Operation Lightning Thunder]. Such an expectation has certainly been expressed by many of the region’s religious leaders, who openly oppose U.S. engagement.”

We agree on the first sentence – the possibility of repeating 2008’s disastrous US-supported operations is a possibility we must take very seriously and must work to prevent. But we don’t think the deployment of these advisers sets us down that path. In fact, we’ve spent the past several years advocating for a comprehensive US strategy to the LRA crisis that places greater emphasis on civilian protection, encouraging peaceful defections from the LRA, and recovery assistance.

The link in second sentence refers to a statement by “Acholi Religious Leaders”, which presumably refers to the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative statement from October 24, 2011. We’ve met with and dialogued with ARLPR many times, and greatly respect their views and prophetic voice over the years for peace. However, our extensive, multi-year conversations with religious leaders in LRA-affected areas of Congo, CAR, and South Sudan have revealed complex, nuanced opinions regarding US engagement and military efforts in these areas. Many of the communities with which they work were attacked by LRA fighters during the Juba peace talks, giving them a far different view of that process than Acholi leaders from northern Uganda. Many of their communities also suffered in the aftermath of Operation Lightning Thunder, of which they’ve also been critical.

But, given their experience during and since the Juba talks, a large number of religious leaders have advocated privately and publicly for increased US and international military efforts to apprehend senior LRA commanders and protect civilians, while simultaneously exploring ways to negotiate with individual LRA commanders. Just this week, civil society leaders representing communities from Uganda, Congo, South Sudan, and Central African Republic issued a statement thanking President Obama for his efforts to address the crisis, specifically applauding his decision to deploy the US military advisers.

5. “Operation Lighting Thunder, and other such missions to fight the LRA in the Central African Republic and in southern Sudan, served mostly to kill efforts to keep beleaguered peace talks going.”

We could, of course, argue for weeks about when and why the Juba talks collapsed. There are no hard and fast answers to this question. But many people who were directly involved in the talks, including some northern Ugandan civil society leaders, believe that Kony had given up on the peace talks long before Ugandan operations were launched. In November 2007 Kony ordered the execution of his second-in-command, Vincent Otti, who was reportedly pushing for the LRA to accept a peace deal. Kony also refused to appoint credible representatives to the talks, sign the final agreement despite multiple chances over a seven-month period, or propose a credible path towards refocusing the negotiations. But, in any case, actions speak louder than words: at the same time he was dragging out peace negotiations, Kony was slowly resuming systematic, documented atrocities against civilians. In March 2008 Kony ordered a trusted commander to commit large-scale attacks in southeast CAR in which dozens of people were abducted, and he also ordered the LRA to kill and abduct Congolese civilians in September 2008, all well before Ugandan operations were launched in December 2008.

6. “Any high expectations in Uganda for the new U.S. soldiers, meanwhile, where dashed when information trickled out of Washington that the troops would probably stay in Kampala and give advice, rather than go into combat.”

Part of this statement is not true – the US government has clearly stated that some of the US advisers, though less than half, will be deployed in LRA-affected areas of the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and likely Congo.

- Paul

So now we’ve got some advisers… what should they do?

November 9, 2011 by Paul

A few weeks ago President Obama announced that he was sending 100 military advisers to central Africa to assist in regional efforts to apprehend Joseph Kony and senior LRA commanders while protecting civilians and encouraging LRA fighters and abductees to defect. As you may have noticed, we’ve been talking about this deployment quite a bit: explaining how the advisers can contribute to President Obama’s comprehensive LRA strategy, debunking Rush Limbaugh’s nonsense, and monitoring Congress’s reaction to the decision.

Now that the dust has settled, it’s time to examine more closely what US advisers should be doing as part of this new effort to achieve an end to LRA violence. Based on our analysis, here are 5 essential tasks for these advisers:

1. Take seriously the mandate to keep civilians safe and help LRA fighters escape:
As President Obama has made clear, the US advisers’ mission is multi-dimensional. In addition to bringing Joseph Kony and LRA commanders to justice, they are charged with improving civilian protection and encouraging LRA defection. This emphasis on a holistic approach needs to be concretely translated in the field. To help protect civilians, US advisers can assist regional forces plan operations that will minimize the possibility of rebel reprisal attacks on surrounding communities – something that has been a major shortcoming in the past. This should include ensuring that military intelligence about LRA movements is fed into civilian early-warning networks so that vulnerable communities can respond before it’s too late. Additionally, US advisers should develop innovative ways to encourage LRA fighters escape, including by getting military forces to place “come home” leaflets along LRA bush paths and broadcasting radio messages when they are out on patrol.

2. Seek out and listen to civilian voices:
The US advisers, who will be deployed primarily with military units, must make sensitive efforts to seek the opinions of local civil society leaders, aid workers, and government leaders. By doing so, they can help repair tense relationships between military and civilian representatives and ensure they are taking the concerns of local communities seriously.

3. Keep a close watch on the Ugandan military:
US advisers should use their deployment in the field to closely monitor the behavior of Ugandan military forces. Many communities in Congo, Central African Republic, and South Sudan welcome the deployment of Ugandan troops, who are better behaved and more proactive against the LRA than other national military forces. But many local communities see the Ugandans’ failure to capture any senior LRA commanders in nearly two years as an indication that they are no longer trying to defeat the LRA. Isolated cases of human rights abuses and reports of Ugandan exploitation of natural resources are also causing tensions. US advisers can deter bad behavior, help keep soldiers accountable for any abuses, and ensure that Ugandan forces are as proactive as possible in stopping LRA violence.

4. Make apprehension operations more targeted and effective:
US advisers should use their expertise to improve the collection of intelligence on the location of Joseph Kony and senior LRA commanders, and then turn that intelligence into effective operational plans. They should also help the Ugandan military plan operations to specifically target LRA commanders and minimize the risk to women, children, and other innocent civilians being held captive by the LRA.

5. Improve collaboration between different military forces:
US advisers should actively seek to improve collaboration between the Ugandan, Congolese, CAR, and South Sudanese military forces. Recently Congo decided that the Ugandan military could no longer operate in its territory, which could transform northern Congo into an enormous safe haven for LRA commanders and give them free reign to attack and abduct civilians there. The ability of US advisers to help mediate disputes at the field level should be matched with more robust US and international efforts to cool tensions and strengthen the fragile regional coalition.

- Paul

*Photo courtesy of Foreign Policy

AFRICOM commander announces plan to send advisers to LRA areas

October 11, 2011 by Paul

Last Tuesday, General Carter Ham spoke about his work as head of AFRICOM (the US military’s Africa Command) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies here in DC (video and audio here). During his talk, General Ham discussed AFRICOM’s involvement in implementing President Obama’s LRA strategy, saying, “We have legislative action here in the United States that requires us to assist in countering the Lord’s Resistance Army” (10:43).

After acknowledging the serious threat the LRA poses to the region, General Ham turned some heads when he mentioned the Obama Administration’s intent to deploy US military advisors directly in LRA-affected areas. He said the advisers would be deployed “in the very near future” to help regional military forces in their efforts to protect civilians and bring LRA commanders to justice (42:20).

If the plan moves forward, such a deployment would constitute the most significant action taken by the US since the White House issued its LRA strategy last year. Though the full details of the deployment have yet to be announced, a few things are clear based on initial conversations with Administration officials.

For starters, the advisers will be doing just that – advising. They will not be mandated to participate in actual combat operations against the LRA. Second, they are likely to be working in a number of different capacities. A few have already been deployed to Congo, where they’ve been training a Congolese military battalion that was recently deployed to LRA-affected areas and working with UN intelligence analysts. But the bulk of the advisers — several dozen who are yet to be deployed — will likely be assisting the Ugandan military, the lead force in operations attempting to apprehend Kony and senior LRA commanders.

With the right mandate, these advisers could be a significant step forward as part of the broader, civilian-led implementation of President Obama’s LRA strategy. Their presence on the ground can help shed light on why current military efforts are failing and lead to better-informed recommendations for how the US and other governments can respond. They can also monitor the human rights record of national militaries receiving US security assistance operating in remote areas, which is increasingly a concern for local civil society and human rights groups.

It is, however, critical that they be tasked not only with improving the chances that Kony and other commanders are captured but also with strengthening efforts to protect civilians in the meantime. Most importantly, they should work with regional militaries to ensure effective measures are in place to protect civilians from LRA reprisal attacks. Too often we’ve seen devastating consequences when this isn’t done, most notably when US-backed, Ugandan-led bombings of LRA camps sparked the Christmas Massacres in December of 2008.

In short, this is a big deal. With the right mandate, US advisers directly on the ground could have a very positive impact. I’ll be writing more about the opportunities – and challenges – this development will pose for President Obama’s LRA strategy as soon as we know more details.

- Paul

P.S. Here are video highlights of Gen. Ham’s statements regarding the LRA

What Thomas Kwoyelo’s trial means for northern Uganda and the LRA

August 2, 2011 by Paul

On Monday of last week I spent most of the day at a courthouse in Gulu, northern Uganda, listening with over 100 local residents to the trial of a former commander in the LRA, Thomas Kwoyelo. The courtroom itself was so crowded that we were sitting outside in plastic chairs under a tent watching a live video feed of the proceedings next door.

Kwoyelo commanded an LRA group that operated in northern Uganda in the 2000s before moving to northern Congo, where he was taken into custody following a clash with Ugandan military forces in March 2009. Monday’s proceedings were the second phase of his trial before a division of Uganda’s High Court, the International Crimes Division, on charges that include grave breaches of willful killing, taking hostages, and extensive destruction of property in northern Uganda.

Though the proceedings themselves were actually quite dull, Kwoyelo’s trial is being closely watched in Gulu, as well as across the region, for several reasons. First, he is the first LRA commander to be formally prosecuted by the Ugandan government in over two decades of conflict. This puts him squarely in the middle of moral and legal debates about whether former LRA commanders should be given amnesty (as many other LRA commanders have been given) or formally prosecuted for crimes committed in the bush. Secondly, Kwoyelo is the first person to be tried before the International Crimes Division, which makes this a very visible test case for a division that is designed to combat impunity for crimes against humanity, war crimes, terrorism, and human trafficking, among other things.

Many people I’ve talked to in northern Uganda this week are indifferent or even displeased with the Ugandan government’s decision to try Kwoyelo. Many point out that former LRA commanders who held higher ranks (and even once commanded Kwoyelo) and are responsible for worse crimes have been given amnesty. They think Kwoyelo has been unfairly singled out because he escaped more recently and the Ugandan government needed a commander not yet given amnesty to put on trial in order to show the world that its new International Crimes Division is being put to use.

Another woman I met, who had been mutiliated by LRA attackers and forced to flee her home, was similarly unimpressed by Kwoyelo’s trial. She now lives in an overcrowded neighborhood in Gulu and is barely able to support her four children. For her, justice means the Ugandan government, itself partly responsible for northern Uganda’s suffering during the war, should help families most affected by the conflict to rebuild her lives. The trial and even conviction of Thomas Kwoyelo will do little in that regard.

Kwoyelo’s trial is also being followed in areas of central Africa under threat from the LRA. LRA commanders have followed developments in Kwoyelo’s case in the past year (sometimes on radios looted from local communities), and will likely continue to do so. What happens to Kwoyelo could play an important role in their decisions on whether to continue fighting with the LRA or try to escape and return home. People I’ve talked to in northern Congo and in northern Uganda have said that Kwoyelo’s trial will likely be a deterrent for would-be escapees, and will reinforce LRA propaganda that offers of amnesty by the Ugandan government are a lie.

All this is complicated even more by the fact that the Ugandan government has shaky legal ground for denying Kwoyelo amnesty and prosecuting him. The 2000 Amnesty Act offers amnesty to all Ugandans engaged in acts of rebellion against the Government of Uganda since January 26, 1986. A 2006 amendment to the Act gives the Ugandan Minister of the Internal Affairs the power to disallow individuals from receiving amnesty, but the Minister has yet to compile this list (or submit it to Parliament for necessary approval).

On Monday Kwoyelo’s lawyers objected to his prosecution on exactly those grounds, and for several other reasons (such as his unconstitutional detention by Ugandan security services following his arrest). His case has now been referred to the Constitutional Court, which will decide on these matters. In the meantime, the effects of this supposedly landmark trial on transitional justice in Uganda and on the efforts to stop current LRA violence will remain in limbo.

-Paul

P.S. For more information, check out an extensive Q&A on the Kwoyelo trial from our partners at Human Rights Watch.

What Thomas Kwoyelo’s trial means for northern Uganda and the LRA

by Paul