Gimme the basics – how often are LRA fighters killing elephants and where?

The LRA’s poaching of elephants has been concentrated in Garamba National Park, a large reserve in northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo). LRA fighters first moved into Garamba in September 2005, and rumors of LRA fighters killing elephants and harvesting ivory have been circulating since at least 2008. However, in the past year a number of LRA escapees have provided eyewitness testimony of increased poaching by LRA, which has been corroborated by clashes between park rangers and suspected LRA poaching parties. For now, it remains unclear how much ivory the LRA has harvested in the past several years.

Is the poaching the work of rogue LRA groups, or do orders come from the top?

Most signs point to Joseph Kony directly ordering LRA fighters to kill elephants in Garamba and harvest ivory, as has been reported by several Congolese and Ugandan defectors who escaped the LRA since early 2012. Kony reportedly tasked Lt. Col. Binansio “Binany” Okumu, who oversaw LRA operations in Congo, with collecting the ivory. Binany was killed in January 2013 by Ugandan troops after returning from a meeting with Kony in the Sudanese-controlled Kafia Kingi enclave. With Binany dead, it’s unclear how frequently the LRA continues to poach elephants.

Does the LRA’s harvesting of ivory signal a shift in their survival tactics?

Possibly. Kony has never before ordered LRA fighters to trade in extremely valuable goods, making his order to poach elephants significant (even if looting small communities remains the LRA’s primary survival tactic). However, Kony’s decision could backfire, especially if remaining LRA combatants become more disillusioned and believe the LRA is drifting further from its core goal of seizing power in Uganda and is becoming just another bandit group in the region.

Is there a connection between the LRA poaching elephants and the new evidence of their relationship with the Sudanese military?

Most likely. Several former Ugandan LRA combatants have testified that LRA combatants, under Kony’s orders, sold or gave ivory to Sudanese troops in Kafia Kingi. This may have been an attempt to curry favor with Sudanese troops who had given LRA troops permission to camp in Kafia Kingi. For more on the relationship between the LRA and Sudan, see our April 2013 report Hidden in Plain Sight: Sudan’s Harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi Enclave.

Is the LRA the only armed group poaching elephants?

Though the LRA poses a serious threat wildlife in the region, it is by no means the only armed group in the region killing elephants in search of ivory. Garamba park rangers believe that that Sudanese, South Sudanese, and Ugandan troops are also poaching elephants in the park, along with other armed poachers. In nearby CAR, Chad, and Cameroon, heavily armed poachers are wiping out massive numbers of elephants on a far larger scale than the LRA. Improving civilian protection and keeping elephants and other wildlife safe requires a comprehensive approach that looks beyond just the LRA. For more on that, check out the report or the work of World Wildlife Fund.

Justice and Reconciliation Project: Acholi women participating in a mato oput ceremony

Last week we highlighted calls from Ugandan (and international) civil society groups urging the Ugandan government to reinstate the amnesty provisions stripped out of Uganda’s Amnesty Act in May 2012. Encouragingly, Ugandan officials actually listened and reinstated the amnesty provisions. (See a joint civil society statement welcoming the move below).

Crucially, the reinstatement gives returnees from the LRA (with the possible exception of senior commanders) the right to receive an amnesty certificate and a reintegration package. However, the Amnesty Commission is in shambles after years of underfunding, delays in appointing top officials, and uncertainty over the future of the Act. Many of the people who have returned from the LRA in recent years have not received their entire reintegration package, and there are few organizations providing trauma healing and psychological assistance. The Commission’s credibility has also been damaged by the Ugandan military’s periodic efforts to force ex-LRA combatants into military service without an adequate opportunity to apply for amnesty. Furthermore, northern Ugandans have very complex views of amnesty, highlighting the need for returnees from the LRA to have opportunities to participate in reconciliation activities with LRA-affected communities.

The Amnesty Act has great potential as a tool to help end the LRA conflict, help returnees reintegration into society, and promote broader reconciliation, but only if we remember amnesty is more than certificate.

–Paul

“Amnesty reinstatement: Press statement from civil society organisations

Welcoming the Full Restoration and Extension of the Uganda Amnesty Act

Tuesday, 28 May 2013

GULU – We the civil society organisations, community and religious leaders welcome the decision by the Government of Uganda to reinstate Part II of the Amnesty Act, and to extend the duration of the whole Act for a further period of two years, in accordance with the recent Resolution of Parliament.

We recall with satisfaction the comprehensive and thorough Report of the Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs which reflected the views of the various stakeholders and the victim-communities, and congratulate the Government for affirming the decision and conclusions of Parliament.

We remain confident that the amnesty will continue, as before, to be a critical tool for ending conflict in Uganda, and for promoting social peace and genuine reconciliation within communities affected by the conflict.

We will endeavour to make known widely the decision of the Government to restore the amnesty, pledge to play our part in encouraging any person still involved in armed rebellion to take advantage of the restored amnesty, which is a gesture of reconciliation and goodwill on the part of the people of Uganda.

We call upon the Amnesty Commission, and the Government of Uganda as a whole, to redouble efforts to make full use of the amnesty law in promoting peace and genuine reconciliation.

We remain committed to working with the Commission, Parliament, the Government and all other stakeholders to realise lasting peace within Uganda and in any country that is affected adversely by any of Uganda’s armed rebellions.

Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative

Concerned Parents Association

Conciliation Resources

Gulu NGO Forum

Human Rights Focus, Gulu

Invisible Children

Iteso Cultural Union

Justice and Peace Commission, Gulu

Ker Kwaro Acholi

Refugee Law Project

Sheik Musa Khelil – Chief Khadi of Acholi

The Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative

The Enough Project

The Rt. Rev. John Gakumba, the Lord Bishop of Northern Uganda

The Rt. Rev M. Baker Ochola – (retired Bishop, Kitgum Diocese)

The Rt. Rev Nelson Onweng – (retired Bishop, Diocese of Northern Uganda)

Uganda Historical Memory & Reconciliation Council

Uganda National Advisory Centre for Men”

A year later, the cost of this decision is clear. Dozens of Ugandans have escaped or defected from the LRA and returned home, only to find themselves in a legal limbo, unable to receive amnesty. This not only includes former male combatants, but also women abducted years ago as young girls who have now have no legal protection from the Ugandan government. Though the Ugandan government is unlikely to prosecute women who return from the LRA, they can use the lack of an amnesty offer as leverage to force former male combatants to join the Ugandan military and fight against the LRA.

Just as disturbing, the work of the Amnesty Commission has almost ground to a halt. Though no longer able to grant amnesty, the remaining sections of the Amnesty Act that were spared the axe last year allowed the Amnesty Commission to continue providing reintegration support to people returning from the LRA. However, the Amnesty Commission has struggled to secure funding and is erratic, at best, in providing new returnees fresh from the LRA with assistance in restarting their lives.

This week, the Ugandan government has a chance to reverse course and reinstate the amnesty-granting provision of the Amnesty Act. Uganda’s Parliament has expressed support for such a move, as have civil society leaders from across Uganda (see below for a joint statement released today which The Resolve supported). Let’s hope that the Ugandan government listens to their voices.

–Paul

“Welcoming the Resolution of Parliament to Restore the Amnesty Act

Amnesty reinstatement: Press statement from civil society organisations

Wednesday, 22 May 2013

GULU – We the civil society organisations and community and religious leaders welcome the resolution of the Parliament of Uganda on 15th May 2013 calling on the Government to reinstate Part II of the Amnesty Act, which was lapsed on 23rd May 2012, and also to extend the duration of the Act, including Part II, for two more years.

We heartily congratulate the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee for its thorough and well-considered report, which reflected the views of the various stakeholders and the victim-communities.

We call upon His Excellency the President, the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Attorney General, in particular, to ensure that the resolution of Parliament, which received support across the political spectrum, is urgently implemented before the Act lapses on 24th May 2013.

We are confident that the restoration of the amnesty will make a positive contribution to the cause of peace in Uganda and the region, by facilitating the defection of rebels, and encouraging other rebel groups to settle their grievances peacefully with the Government.

We are aware that the Government of Uganda proposes to develop further principles for addressing the past, but we are convinced that it is essential first to reinstate Part II of the Amnesty Act, even as proposals on transitional justice are developed in a considered, unhurried manner.

We will continue to work with all stakeholders and the Government to bring sustainable peace to Uganda and the region.

Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative

Concerned Parents Association

Gulu NGO Forum

Human Rights Focus, Gulu

Invisible Children

Iteso Cultural Union

Justice and Peace Commission, Gulu

Justice and Reconciliation Project

Ker Kwaro Acholi

Refugee Law Project

The Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative

Rt. Bishop M. Baker Ochola – Kitgum Archdiocese

Rt. Bishop Onono Onweng – Diocese of northern Uganda

Rt. Rev. Canon Johnson Gakumba – Diocese of northern Uganda

Sheik Musa Khelil – Chief Khadi of Acholi

Uganda Historical Memory & Reconciliation Council”

In June 2012, to great fanfare, the UN Secretary General released a UN regional strategy on the LRA. The strategy was designed to help coordinate and improve the counter-LRA efforts of the alphabet soup of UN agencies, peacekeeping missions, and senior officials working on the crisis. For donors and civil society groups, one particular hope was that the UN would create a list of “priority projects” whose implementation could help fill critical gaps in the field.

Unfortunately, that hope has been stuck in a bureacratic purgatory ever sense. UN officials circulated the first drafts of the priority projects in mid-2012, but disappointed many with their lack of detail. Progress in developing the list was so slow that in December 2012 the UN Security Council formally requested the Secretary General to submit a list of priority projects as part of a broader implementation plan for the strategy.

Unfortunately, the list of 17 priority projects submitted to the Council by the Secretary General in April 2013 was little better than the initial drafts. The project descriptions lacked detailed cost estimates, analysis of how they’d add value to existing initatives, and are extremely vague about specific activities and timelines. Donor countries interested in funding quality projects are extremely frustrated by poor quality of the UN effort, and at the moment any hope of enticing new non-traditional donors is far-fetched.

Why has the UN done such a terrible job at a seemingly simple task? It’s not for lack of ideas: everyone working LRA issues can identify key gaps that need to be filled, and there’s a broad consensus on a few key projects, such as rehabiliting the key road connecting South Sudan and CAR. The biggest problem may be that the SG tasked the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) with compiling the list. UNOCA lacks the programmatic expertise that UN agencies working in the field have, and is so understaffed it doesn’t even have one dedicated person to help SRSG Abou Moussa coordinate the UN LRA strategy.

So at least for now, UNOCA clearly lacks the ability to get the myraid UN agencies and missions operational in LRA-affected areas to cooperate in identifying realistic projects and putting together solid proposals that can reassure donors they won’t be wasting their money. Unfortunately, the SG’s office has simply ignored the fact that the list of projects they’re submitting to the Council and donors have little hope of being funded or implemented in the near future, in the process making a mockery of the Council’s request for “priority projects.”

When the Council takes up the issue of the LRA at the end of the month, they’ll face the unpleasant choice of either finding a way to pressure the Secretary General to take implementation of the UN LRA strategy seriously, or simply acquiesing to its slow march towards irrelevancy.

–Paul



Today, we released a new report documenting Sudanese support to the LRA from October 2009 until at least February 2013. You can download it here in full. The report shows that for the last four years the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) allowed LRA fighters – including Joseph Kony himself – to periodically use the Kafia Kingi enclave as a safe haven from which to avoid pursuing troops.

Kafia Kingi is a territory straddling the borders of Sudan, South Sudan, and Central African Republic. It is claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan but currently controlled by Sudan. Ugandan-led forces pursuing Kony, authorized by the African Union, are not allowed access to the area.

The information in the report stems mostly from the testimonies of eight different LRA defectors who confirmed LRA movements into Kafia Kingi. Five of those defectors confirmed that LRA fighters met with SAF personnel near the SAF garrison at Dafak in Kafia Kingi. SAF personnel also provided LRA forces with limited material support, largely in the form of basic medicine and food supplies. The SAF previously provided arms, training, and safe haven to the LRA from 1994 until 2004, but their quiet renewal of support since 2009 has gone largely undocumented by the international community.

The report also includes satellite imagery showing the likely location of Joseph Kony’s recent camp within the enclave. Matching intelligence shared by LRA defectors, the imagery shows the camp was established in late 2011 along the banks of the Umbelasha River and then abandoned between February and March of 2013.

Support of any kind from Sudan to the LRA presents a serious threat to the success of current efforts to end LRA violence in the region, which has now stretched nearly three decades. However, the news in the report isn’t all bad. Significantly, no evidence has yet surfaced suggesting Sudan has provided new arms to the LRA. Moreover, the fact that the LRA was allowed to operate from disputed territory — with very limited evidence of their movement into Sudan proper — suggests that the Sudanese may be opting to keep Kony at arm’s length.

This silver lining underscores the importance of diplomatic efforts to prevent further support from flowing to Kony from the Sudanese government. In the report, we recommend that the African Union take the lead in negotiating directly with Sudan to see that happen, with support from governments of LRA-affected countries, the United Nations, and other concerned members of the international community such as the United States.

Our thanks go out to partners at Invisible Children and Enough Project, who co-produced the report and provided invaluable input, as well as to Amnesty International USA and DigitalGlobe for providing the satellite imagery and analysis. And as always, we are grateful to all of those who shared their stories with me and other researchers in the hopes that it would make a difference.

- Paul Ronan

The report we released today  used a range of sources to confirm the LRA’s movement into Sudanese-controlled territory and Sudan’s renewed support for the rebel group. However, the source likely to generate the most attention is satellite imagery analysis.

Satellite imagery and other remote sensing technologies are being increasingly adopted for human rights purposes. Efforts being undertaken by the Satellite Sentinel Project — tracking atrocities in Sudan — and Amnesty International USA’s Science and Human Rights team — such as this imagery from Aleppo, Syria– have been particularly pioneering in this regard.

Our use of satellite imagery showing the probable location of LRA leader Joseph Kony’s recent camp in Sudanese-controlled territory is likely to raise a number of questions. How did we locate the camp? Why are we confident it is actually the LRA’s camp, where Kony is thought to have resided? And how did we get the imagery?

To be credible, satellite imagery analysis usually needs to be paired with other sources of information.

In our case, a 2010 UN report documented the LRA’s first incursion into a Sudanese-controlled area known as the Kafia Kingi enclave, which took place in October 2009 and included a meeting with Sudanese military officials near their garrison near the village of Dafak. In 2012, we received new reports from LRA defectors and other sources which indicated the LRA had subsequently established a camp approximately 8-10 kilometers south of the Dafak garrison. In December of 2012, we approached experts at Amnesty International USA with this information, and they offered to purchase imagery analysis of the area from DigitalGlobe, a commercial provider of satellite imagery and analysis.

DigitalGlobe analysts had identified the likely location of the Dafak garrison in previous analysis, and it matched public reports and our own field research. Civilians displaced by the LRA’s incursion into the area had even helped my teammate Paul draw a rough map showing the Dafak garrison and LRA camps.

DigitalGlobe’s analysis of a 100 square kilometer area around the Dafak garrison, shared with us on January 10, showed that some time between 2009 and 2011, a camp with four tents was established approximately 8.7 kilometers south of the garrison. Several cultivated plots of land also emerged approximately 3.6 kilometers south of the garrison. Both had been abandoned by early 2013. Though one or both of these may have been created by the LRA, our research had indicated a much larger LRA presence than such a small camp could shelter, so we considered it inconclusive.

Then, in February and March, we received further reports with new details suggesting that as later waves of LRA members arrived in Kafia Kingi, an LRA encampment had been established further southwest of the garrison, perhaps 15-20 kilometers away, near a river likely to be the Umbelasha. We again approached Amnesty International USA, who generously underwrote further imagery analysis that DigitalGlobe conducted.

This time, we were confident we found what we were looking for.

Imagery we received on April 4th clearly showed the emergence of a camp along the banks of the Umbelasha River, 17 kilometers southwest of the Dafak garrison. No human activity was visible in the area until November 2011, when the imagery showed burned grass, a common precursor for planting crops. In the next imagery available, from March 2012, semi-permanent structures had been built and there was clear delineation of farmland with crops planted that matched LRA defector reports. The camp reached peak activity in December of 2012, before being abandoned some time between February and March 2013, again matching information from multiple sources.

As for LRA leader Joseph Kony, several LRA defectors had testified that he first moved into Kafia Kingi in late 2010. After a short time there, during which some of his deputies met again with Sudanese officials, he reportedly moved back into Central African Republic before returning again to Kafia Kingi in late 2011. This time frame corresponds with the initial signs of the encampment 17 kilometers southwest of Dafak. Our research suggested Kony likely stayed at the LRA’s encampment in Kafia Kingi for significant portions of 2012. None of our research has indicated there was more than one major LRA camp complex in the enclave, indicating that the one we identified was likely where Kony stayed.

Other knowledgeable sources have since confirmed that the camp we located in Sudanese-controlled territory has also been identified by Ugandan military officials — likely with assistance from their US partners — as likely to be Kony’s recent camp.

Is any of this bullet proof? No. Nor has every piece of information we received about LRA presence in Sudanese-controlled territory over the past three years matched up perfectly, though faulty memories and the difficulty of gaining access to these areas makes that all but inevitable. However, we received enough credible information from a range of independent sources to give us confidence in our report’s findings, including those derived from satellite imagery analysis.

Now that the report is published and the information is public, we will be turning our attention toward galvanizing international action to ensure Sudan’s support to the LRA is now definitively ended. In the meantime, we owe a huge debt of gratitude to Amnesty International USA and DigitalGlobe for their support for this effort.

-Michael Poffenberger

Earlier today, the US Ambassador for Global Criminal Justice Stephen Rapp announced that LRA leaders Joseph Kony, Dominic Ongwen, and Okot Odhiambio – as well as Rwandan rebel leader Sylvestre Madacumura – are being added to the US War Crimes Rewards (WCR) program, authorizing a reward of up to $5 million to anyone who provides information leading to their arrest. Notably, the announcement was made possible by the passage of legislation sponsored by then-Senator Kerry (D-MA) and Representative Ed Royce (R-CA); it was the last legislation Kerry sponsored that passed before he became US Secretary of State.

This new tool could prove critical for efforts to bring LRA commanders to justice and end the group’s atrocities, though its implementation does carry some risks. The program also only works if there is an entity that can act on tip-offs received; in other words, if US and Ugandan forces withdraw from operations to pursue the LRA as reports indicate they may, the program will be largely toothless.

In this post, we discuss whether the WCR program can have a role in securing the arrest of Kony and his two deputies, and the details of how it will be implemented. You can also find more information on the website of the program itself.

What is “War Crimes Rewards” and “Rewards for Justice?”
A program called “Rewards for Justice” was first established in 1984 targeting foreign terrorists who pose a threat to the United States. The State Department later expanded the program by adding “War Crimes Rewards” in 1998 to help track down fugitives wanted for war crimes. It can provide rewards of up to $5 million for information that leads to the arrest of specific criminals.

Who is eligible to be targeted by WCR?
Originally, only individuals indicted by special tribunals for Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and Sierra Leone were eligible to be targeted by the program. However, on January 15, 2013, President Obama signed into law a bill making any foreign national accused of crimes against humanity, genocide, or war crimes by any international, mixed, or hybrid criminal tribunal eligible targets for WCR. This includes Kony, Ongwen, and Odhiambo, who were indicted by International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2005. The bill’s passage marked the first time that Congress has authorized a formal relationship between the US and the ICC , which many Members of Congress have previously opposed.

How can this be used to help bring LRA leaders to justice?
By adding Kony, Ongwen, and Odhiambio to the WCR program, the State Department has increased the chances they will be brought to justice in several ways.

First, the financial reward could incentivize LRA fighters and commanders to defect from the LRA in order to share information about the location of the three eligible commanders with US authorities. This would not only lead to better information on their whereabouts, but also drain the LRA of the fighters essential for its survival. Crucially, it could also sow divisions and suspicions within LRA ranks if Kony and other commanders fear betrayal, which would further diminish their capacity to perpetrate attacks on civilians.

Second, the financial reward could incentivize local hunters, nomadic groups (such as the Mbororo), or other people who may have information about the location of the three eligible commanders to share it with US authorities. Community members in some LRA-affected areas of CAR and Congo that have been repeatedly targeted by LRA attacks have already been willing to share information about the location of LRA groups and commanders. However, people in areas of northern CAR and Sudan, where senior LRA commanders are thought to be located, have been less cooperative, so a financial reward could provide the impetus needed to facilitate information sharing.

Less likely (but still possible), lowly research groups such as ourselves or others working in LRA-affected areas could presumably benefit from a reward.

How can it be advertised, especially to LRA groups in remote areas?
The WCR program has a budget for advertising the financial reward for the three LRA commanders, and in the coming weeks US government officials will spreading the word in a variety of ways. They will likely use radio broadcasts as the main tool, but could also use leaflet drops over areas of LRA activity and briefings for local communities.

Who can receive the award, and how can they share the information?
Anybody is eligible to receive the financial award, with the exception of government officials acting in their official capacity and individuals under US sanction. To receive the award, the information provided by the individual must lead to the arrest, transfer, or conviction of one of the three LRA commanders. The State Department website has guidance on how to directly share information regarding the whereabouts of an indictee. To determine the size of the reward, the State Department takes into consideration the importance of the target, the risk taken by informant, the value of the specific information they gave, and other factors. Most rewards issued range from $400,000 to $2 million.

Do informants face any risk?
Though the LRA will likely be unable to identify or locate specific informants, some informants could face risks or challenges, such as coping with a large influx of cash while living in an impoverished community. To minimize risk to the informant, the State Department does not reveal the identity of informants and can provide a range of witness protection measures.

Is there any risk of LRA reprisal attacks?
Though the LRA has intentionally reduced civilian killings in recent years, there will be a risk of LRA reprisal attacks. LRA commanders have ordered reprisal attacks and massacres following the launch of international interventions in the past, including the announcement of the ICC indictments in 2005 and the launch of Operation Lightning Thunder in 2008. To mitigate this risk, US officials should work with military forces, peacekeepers, and early warning civilian protection networks in LRA-affected areas to ensure they are informed about the WCR program and are taking steps to prevent LRA reprisal attacks.

With the Ugandan and US operations focused on stopping LRA atrocities hovering close to collapse due to unrest in the Central African Republic (CAR), we joined partners to release a statement today urging the two governments to stay committed to the mission.

“As the international community seeks to address the upheaval in CAR, it is critical that they find ways to sustain efforts to address LRA violence. A premature withdrawal would have devastating and immediate consequences for civilians in LRA-affected areas,” the statement reads. “It gives Kony a new lease on life, enabling him to regain power by initiating new rounds of abductions in communities that will be left totally unprotected and vulnerable to LRA attacks.”

Ten local civil society organizations in CAR held a meeting just this morning to discuss the situation and issued their own statements, which you can read here. Some select quotes from local leaders:

“If these two force leave us, we will fall back in the same situation that we found during the highest times of the LRA conflict.” -Local Protection Committee of Obo

“No one here ignores the intrinsic value of the support these two forces provide in the fight against the LRA rebels of Joseph Kony. From the depths of our hearts, women from Haut-Mbomou oppose themselves to this precipitated departure, as it will lead to sexual abuse on girls and women, and to them becoming porters.” – Women Association

“We pray you to reconsider your decision. After the forces leave, LRA will enter immediately in our city. Because Haut Mbomou is an autonomous district, Bangui does not react to our calls of distress.’” – Radio Zereda

“In our opinion, the departure of Ugandan and American troops from our region wold be a disaster. We, in the name of the religious leaders in the LRA-affected region, pray you to retract this decision, until the day this Ugandan rebel group will be ousted out of CAR.” – Catholic Church leader

Ugandan and US operations — which have been authorized by the African Union and focused on LRA-affected areas of CAR — have made significant progress in reducing LRA atrocities in recent years. However, the Ugandan government suspended their operations last week after the CAR government was overthrown.

- Michael

Initial reports suggest the US draw back was sparked by questions over whether the Ugandans intend to continue the mission. The US role is only advisory and depends on partner governments in the region to lead, particularly Uganda. While Ugandan officials announced publicly that they will sustain their operations, there are some reports suggesting this may not be the case and that they are still weighing options in the aftermath of the CAR change of government.

As we wrote Tuesday, the Ugandan-led, US-supported military operations, which were authorized by the African Union in 2011, have helped reduce the LRA threat significantly in recent years. LRA attacks, killings, and abductions of civilians have declined precipitously. However, the withdrawal of Ugandan and US forces now — or any time before Joseph Kony is captured and the group’s command structure fully dismantled — could allow these gains to be reversed.

The recent upheaval in CAR has caused a humanitarian crisis for much of the country and deserves urgent attention from the international community. It is possible that the broader dynamics there will eclipse operations against the LRA. However, it will be critical to guard against any decision to end regional counter-LRA efforts that is premature or unnecessary, as it will leave civilians much more exposed to further LRA atrocities and set back hopes for a permanent end to the crisis.

- Michael

On March 21, we heard the great news that 28 women and children were released from LRA captivity.  As the LRA Crisis Tracker reports, the group was actually escorted and purposefully let go by four LRA fighters near the town of Digba in Bas-Uele district of northern DRC. This is the largest return of long-term LRA members in at least three years, and is a truly encouraging achievement for efforts to incentivize LRA defections, which have been expanded in the past year.

Our LRA Crisis Tracker received the report from a community that is part of the HF Radio Early Warning Network in DR Congo. The defectors consisted of eight women (18+), 13 girls (0-17), and seven boys (0-3). Tragically, one woman drowned on the journey from Digba to the neighboring town of Ango. Most of the woman and children are from DR Congo, but there are others from Uganda, South Sudan, and Central African Republic. At least three of the women have been in LRA captivity for over ten years and the rest for two years or more.

This is a great sign, and builds on a surge of defections we’ve seen among Ugandan LRA fighters in recent months as well. Our own Paul Ronan is currently in the field to evaluate how efforts to encourage defections from the LRA can be improved further, and next time perhaps the LRA fighter will join the women and children in defecting.

- Chelsea

photo credit: Invisible Children

A violent change of government that took place in the Central African Republic over the weekend could lead to the withdrawal of Ugandan and US forces working to track down LRA groups in the eastern part of the country. The departure of Ugandan and US forces from CAR, which are operating there under an authorization from the African Union and with permission from the previous CAR government, would create a security vacuum in LRA-affected areas and allow the reversal of significant gains made against the LRA in recent years.

The “Seleka” coalition, as it is known, seized control of the capital city of Bangui on Sunday. One of the rebel leaders, Michel Djotodia (profiled here), has claimed the Presidency while deposed President Francoise Bozize has fled to Cameroon. Seleka is a combination of five different CAR rebel groups that emerged in December of 2012 with claims that the central government had not delivered on promises made in previous peace agreements.

Seleka representatives previously called for the exit of all “foreign forces” from CAR. While they are likely focused most on the Chadian, South African, and other forces from neighboring countries that deployed in a (failed) effort to protect the former regime, there are indications they may ask Ugandan and US forces, which operate only with permission from the central government, to leave as well. A senior Seleka leader recently called publicly for the Ugandans to leave, though Ugandan and US government sources indicated to us that no formal request for their departure has been made since Seleka seized power.

The Ugandans have pursued the LRA in CAR, with some success, since 2009. In 2011, the African Union provided a political mandate for regional operations against the LRA and the US sent military advisors to support the Ugandan-led efforts. During this time, LRA attacks, killings, and abductions of civilians have declined significantly, and defections from LRA ranks have surged.

The withdrawal of Ugandan and US forces now – or any time before Joseph Kony is captured and the group’s command structure fully dismantled – could reverse these gains. The Ugandan-led military operations have weakened the LRA and prevented them from being able to integrate many of the civilians they abduct into their ranks. Without military pressure, Kony could rebuild much of the capacity that the LRA has lost over the past several years. And with no alternative forces that can pursue the LRA or provide protection, civilians in LRA-affected areas – who have largely welcomed the Ugandan and US deployments – would be left more exposed to LRA attacks.

One of Seleka’s member groups, the UFDR, itself clashed with the LRA back in 2010, and a field interview we conducted with a UFDR representative in 2011 suggested they view the LRA with extreme hostility. However, the UFDR may have received some support for its rebellion from the Government of Sudan (as many civil society leaders in eastern CAR believe and this 2007 HRW report alleges), which has an interest in seeing its longtime enemy Uganda depart from its backyard in CAR. In 2010, disputes between Ugandan and UFDR forces over control of diamond mines in the town of Sam Ouandja (Ugandan forces were allegedly preventing the UFDR from exploiting the illegal diamond trade, though this is disputed) also led to the Ugandans being forced to leave that town.

All this to say: there is cause for concern that the political upheaval in CAR could deal a devastating setback for international efforts to end LRA atrocities. In the short term, there is no alternative to the Ugandan-led, US-supported operations that could realistically hope to address the LRA’s threat to civilians. As international leaders engage with the newly installed CAR government to help reestablish some semblance of security and democratic governance in the country, they should urge cooperation with the African Union-authorized regional counter-LRA mission and allow Ugandan and US forces to stay put.

- Michael